Real Property--Notice of Restrictive Covenants in Kentucky by Carroll, Wayne J.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 1 Article 10
1956
Real Property--Notice of Restrictive Covenants in
Kentucky
Wayne J. Carroll
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carroll, Wayne J. (1956) "Real Property--Notice of Restrictive Covenants in Kentucky," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 45 : Iss. 1 , Article
10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol45/iss1/10
KENTucCY LAw JouRNAL
out the permission of the donor, is clearly shown, the mere fact that
the donor keeps the machine in her garage, or wishes to supplement
her kindness by paying all the expenses incident to the operation of
the machine cannot be regarded as the retention of such dominion
over the machine as to render the gift ineffective.3 2
In analyzing this case it is apparent that the subject of the gift is
the automobile. And it is equally clear that the absolute, most un-
equivocal delivery possible would be a single act of giving the keys
and the car simultaneously. In view of this there was no actual de-
livery here. But was there a symbolic delivery;-a transfer of the means
of control, the keys to the car? Undoubtedly there was, not once, but
many times. But since in daily life such a transaction is a very com-
mon occurrence, it might well be inconsistent with a gift and indica-
tive of only a bailment. Therefore, to find any concrete basis for en-
forcing the gift it is necessary to rely on the constructive delivery con-
cept. Since the delivery of the keys was equivocal, yet clearly an act
possible of construction as a gift, the validity of the gift rests finally
on the donor's manifestation of intention. Did the donor manifest so
strong an intent to give that the gift should be sustained despite an
equivocal act of delivery? The court felt that she did. In view of the
conflicting nature of the evidence and the apparent equal weight on
each side, it seems more realistic to say that she did not, that no clear
manifestation of intent was shown. But this, it would seem, is an in-
evitable difference of opinion in such cases. This case undoubtedly
represents the extremity of the constructive delivery concept where
final determination of validity must rest on opinion.
I. Leland Brewster
REAL PROPERTY-NOTICE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
IN KENTUCKY
Restrictive covenants that run with the land are enforceable against
a subsequent purchaser only if he has notice of them.1 This note dis-
cusses the various ways of obtaining notice of restrictive covenants in
Kentucky including actual, implied, inquiry, and constructive notice.
For classification purposes the kinds of notice may be defined as fol-
lows: Actual notice is information concerning the existence of the
32 Id. at 431, 200 S.W. at 652.
1 A purchaser will be bound, either by his knowledge o fthe covenant or by
constructive notice from the record thereof. Patton on Titles, 1036 (1938). Also
note 14 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 659-663.
NOTES
covenant, directly and personally communicated to the purchaser.
2 Im-
plied notice exists when the purchaser is shown to have had knowledge
of such facts and circumstances as would give a reasonable, prudent
man actual knowledge of the covenant. 3 Inquiry notice occurs when
one has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man
on inquiry as to the particular fact, and he omits to make such inquiry
with reasonable diligence.4 Constructive notice is based on the as-
sumption that no information concerning the covenant has been di-
rectly and personally communicated to the purchaser but his knowl-
edge of it is inferred by operation of legal presumption as a conse-
quence of recordation.5
AcruAL NoTicE
If a purchaser has actual notice of restrictions at the time of pur-
chase, he is bound by them even though they are not in his deed.6
Hammonds v. Eads7 illustrates clearly the meaning and effect of actual
notice in Kentucky even though it involved an easement rather than a
covenant; the meaning of actual notice is clearly the same in both
instances. In this case Mrs. Eads' deed provided that "when the Hang-
ing fork is past fording and the grantee cannot get across same to the
above land, she is to have the right to pass over the other lands of the
grantor to same."" A Mrs. Hammonds was about to purchase the land
in which the easement existed. Mrs. Eads sent her stepson to see Mrs.
Hammonds' agent. The son showed the agent the deed and the ease-
ment provision in it. The court held that the act of showing the pur-
chaser the deed and informing him of the easement prior to purchase
constituted actual notice of the restriction. They also dismissed the
possibility of constructive notice even though the recorded deed had
been conveyed from a common grantor with Mrs. Eads. The phrase
"other lands" was too general to determine the particular lands to
which it applied.
2 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., 611, 612. The definitions in the footnotes numbered two
through five have been changed somewhat to make them applicable specifically to
the restrictive covenant situations. For a general discussion of Notice, see 39 Am.
Jur. 233 (1942).
3 Interstate Life and Accident Co. v. Wilson, 52 Ga. App. 171, 183 S.E. 672,
677 (1935).
4 Coleman v. Armstrong, 128 Okla. 87, 261 P. 228, 230 (1927).
5 2 Porn. Eq. Jur., 641-643.
6Hegna v. Peters, 199 Iowa 259, 201 N.W. 803-804 (1925). Where the
court says, "[T]he evidence satisfactorily shows that he (purchaser) knew of and
was advised that building restrictions existed on all this property before he bought
it. This being so, whatever restrictions there were will be binding on him, al-
though omitted from his deed."
7 Hammond v. Eads, 146 Ky. 162, 142 S.W. 379 (1912).
s Id. at 163, 142 S.W. at 379.
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Other jurisdictions, in accord with the general principle, have held
that actual notice of an unrecorded covenant9 or a valid parol agree-
ment10 binds the purchaser. There is also the possibility that a pur-
chaser would be bound if he had actual notice of restrictions in an
instrument of record outside the chain of title" or one which is de-
fectively acknowledged.'
2
ImTLmD NonicE
Under certain circumstances notice of restrictions will be implied
even though the purchaser actually does not know about them and
they are not of record. A common example is where the restrictions
are imposed as part of a general building plan or scheme for the de-
velopment of contiguous lots. Restrictive covenants imposed in this
manner are for the benefit of all the lots included in the tract and may
be enforced by the owner of any lot against the owner of any other
lot.13 In many of these cases implied notice is not involved because
the covenants are recited in the recorded deed or placed of record as
part of the plat. In one Kentucky case,14 however, the recorded plat
did not mention the restrictions. Although the purchaser conceded he
had notice of the restrictions recited in his deed, he contended he had
no notice, actual or constructive, of a general building scheme that
would permit the restrictions to be enforced by any vendee of a lot
within the area. The court found sufficient proof of a "general scheme
and purpose" to cause the covenants to run with the land. But this
only partly solved the problem because the purchaser must have
notice of them in order for the restrictions to be enforceable by any
vendee against him. Concerning this aspect of the case the court
reasoned that if actual notice of the building scheme were necessary,
(in the absence of constructive notice) the facts were sufficient to
"impute knowledge" to the purchaser. The court said:
Those facts consisted in the advertisements referred to,
(these stated that the subdivision would be used for "residence pur-
9Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md. 493, 17 A. 372 (1889). An-
notation 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1129. Also, Cotton v. Creese, 80 N.J. Eq. 540, 85 A. 600
(1912). A written agreement between adjoining lot owners that each should not
build nearer than three feet to the common line in certain places is enforceable
against a purchaser with notice.
1049 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358 (1914).
11 Stetson v. Cook, 39 Mich. 750 (1878).
12 Horseshoe Coal Co. v. Fields, 207 Ky. 172, 268 S.W. 1078 (1925); Graves
v. Graves, 6 Gray (Mass.) 391 (1856). These cases held that a defectively
acknowledged deed was not recordable, and therefore would not give constructive
notice. But suppose it was recorded and the purchaser had actual knowledge of
the restrictions in it. Then it seems he would be bound by them.
'3 For discussion see note at 89 A.L.R. 815 (1934).
14 Greer v. Bornstein, 246 Ky. 286, 54 S.W. 2d 927 (1932).
NoTEs
poses only") and the ever present one of universal observance of the
covenants by every other owner of the lots in the subdivision, even
by the plaintiff herself up to the date when she attempted to commit
the violation complained of. 15
The court's terminology concerning the "imputed knowledge" of the
purchaser is not helpful in classifying the type of notice. Assuming no
constructive notice, the facts show the purchaser had implied notice
of the restrictions. He had knowledge of the advertisements and ob-
servance by others pointing to the existence of a general building
scheme. These facts and circumstances should lead him to knowledge
that the restrictions ran with the land. Thus, in a typical building
scheme situation, the Kentucky court in effect found implied notice to
the purchaser or in their words, he had "imputed knowledge" of the
restrictions.
Another possibility, and probably a preferable solution, would have
been to find that the purchaser had constructive notice of both the
restrictions and the general building scheme because every deed from
the original grantor had contained the covenants. This should have
given the purchaser notice from the record that a general building
scheme existed.
INQUImY NoTIcE
No Kentucky cases have been found which expressly place a pur-
chaser on inquiry notice of restrictive covenants, but the common law
principle of inquiry notice has been adopted in other cases. These
cases state that notice of facts which would put a man of ordinary
prudence and intelligence on inquiry is equivalent to knowledge of all
of the facts which a reasonably diligent inquiry might disclose.16 When
stated this broadly, the principle would clearly seem to encompass the
covenant situation.
Other jurisdictions have specifically held that the purchaser of land
is on inquiry notice of restrictive covenants under certain circumstances.
In these cases two problems have arisen: (1) what facts put a pur-
chaser on inquiry, (2) to what extent is the purchaser held to inquire.
A purchaser may be put to inquiry from facts in the record which are
insufficient to constitute constructive notice or from facts outside the
record pointing toward the existence of uniform restrictions.
Concerning inquiry notice from facts of record, one case involved
an effort by one purchaser in a platted subdivision to enforce a building
15 Id. at 290, 54 SAV. 2d at 929.
16 Sentry Safety Control Corp. v. Broadway and 4th Ave. Realty Co., 276 Ky.
648, 124 S.W. 2d 1051 (1939); Charles v. Whitt, 187 Ky. 77, 218 S.W. 994
(1920).
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restriction against another purchaser.Y7 There appeared on the re-
corded plat for the area a dotted line and the words, "Fifteen ft. build-
ing restriction." But on the minute books of the developing company
was a stipulation that the restriction was to expire in ten years. Since
the time limit had elapsed, the court refused to enforce the covenant
and held that the facts of record should have placed the purchaser on
"special inquiry" as to the time limitation on the covenant. The extent
of the inquiry should have included the minute books of the grantor
where the restriction was stated.
A well-known Michigan case, Sanborn v. McLean,18 illustrates the
view that certain facts outside the record, such as the existence of a
building scheme, are sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry of
restrictions. The purchaser there was held to inquiry primarily be-
cause he had seen the strictly uniform residential character of the
lots, all of which contained expensive dwellings. The purchaser should
have inquired beyond his grantor or neighbors, and examined the
record which showed the reason for the uniformly residential use. The
court also suggested that the purchaser had constructive notice of the
restrictions because they were inserted by the common grantor in the
deeds to the other lots even though not in his chain of title. However,
the restrictions recited in the deeds expressly applied only to the lots
conveyed. To hold that the purchaser has constructive notice that
restrictions on the land conveyed apply to the lot retained may result
in an injustice to one who has no actual knowledge of the building
scheme. In most of the cases in which a purchaser has actual knowl-
edge of a building scheme or other facts pointing to the existence of
restrictions a preferable solution would be to place on him a duty to
make reasonable inquiries.
In comparing the Kentucky view with the analysis in the Sanborn
case, it is interesting to note that practically all of the Kentucky cases
involving a uniform residential scheme have held the purchaser to
constructive notice because of recordation. 19 But these cases on their
17 McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 319, 90 A. 73 (1914). For a deed containing a
covenant putting the purchaser on inquiry see Pearson v. Stafford, 88 N.J. Eq. 385,
102 A. 836 (1918).
Is Sanborn v. McLean, 283 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496, 498, 60 A.L.R. 1212
(1925). Also see 144 A.L.R. 916 (1943).
19 Holliday v. Sphar, 262 Ky. 45, 89 S.W. 2d 237 (1935) (recorded deed
contained the restrictions). Greer v. Bornstein, 246 Ky. 286, 54 S.W. 2d 927
(1932) (restrictions were in every recorded deed even though not in the re-
corded plat). Biltmore Development Co. v. Kohn, 239 Ky. 460, 39 S.W. 2d 687
(1931). All deeds in purchaser's chain of title contained the restrictive covenant.
Anderson v. Henslee, 226 Ky. 465, 11 S.W. 2d 154 (1928), restrictions were
contained in the deed. Crutcher v. Moffett, 204 Ky. 444, 266 S.W. 6 (1924),
restrictions were contained in the original deed even though not in subsequent
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facts did not raise the problem of recordation out of the chain of title.
Harp v. Parker,2 0 discussed infra, affords an opportunity to compare
the Kentucky view on this latter point with the Sanborn case.
CONSTRIUvE NOTiCE
Constructive notice of restrictions is given to a purchaser by re-
cordation and legal presumption.21 Thus a deed or even a recorded
plat with restrictions, 22 if in the chain of title, is sufficient to give con-
structive notice of restrictive covenants running with the land.
Although it is clear that a purchaser has constructive notice of
restrictions appearing in his direct chain of title the problem remains
as to the scope of notice given by a recordation not in the direct chain
of title. Two types of off-conveyances containing restrictive covenants
present the notice problem. In the first type the common grantor who
owns two or more lots conveys one of them with restrictions in the
deed expressly applicable to the lot retained. In the second type the
grantor conveys one of the lots with restrictions in the deed expressly
applicable only to the one conveyed, not mentioning the retained lot.
In both cases the grantor later conveys the retained lot but does not
mention any restrictive covenants as being applicable to it.
In the first type of off-conveyance Kentucky has held the purchaser
of the second lot to have constructive notice of the restrictive covenant.
In Harp v. Parker-3 the grantor who owned two lots conveyed one
with a restriction in the deed that nothing would be built on the re-
tained lot nearer the road than the front line of the grantor's residence.
Subsequently, the retained lot was conveyed with no mention of such
restrictions. However, even though the purchaser of the retained lot
had no actual notice of the restrictions or record notice in his direct
chain of title, the Kentucky Court, citing Tiffany, stated:
A purchaser is, it appears, ordinarily charged with notice
of an incumbrance upon the property created by an instrument which
is of record, although the primary purpose of such instrument is, not
the creation of such incumbrance, but the conveyance of neighboring
deeds and the purchaser was held to constructive notice. Highland Realty Co. v.
Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S.W. 420 (1908), restrictions were contained in the
deed to the lot.
20 Harp v. Parker, 278 Ky. 78, 128 S.W. 2d 211 (1939).
21 See Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With Land, 162 (1929).
22 Parrish v. Newbury, 279 S.W. 2d 229 (Ky. 1955). Building restrictions or
anything else properly written upon a recordable plat become a part of it and
constitute constructive notice.2 3 Harp v. Parker, supra note 20. Other jurisdictions in accord with the Ken-
tucky rule are: Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915); Finley v. Glenn,
303 Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931).
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property. ... And if, in conveying lot A, the grantor enters into a
restrictive agreement as to the improvement of lot B, retained by him,
a subsequent purchaser of lot B would ordinarily be charged with
notice of the agreement, by reason of its record as a part of the
conveyance of lot A. Were he not so charged, the restrictive agree-
ment might be to a considerable extent nugatory.
24
Thus in every instance where two or more lots have been conveyed by
a common grantor, the Kentucky abstractor must examine all the gran-
tor's deeds of off-conveyance for restrictive covenants expressly ap-
plicable to the land retained.25 Because of the magnitude of the title
examiner's task under this view, many states have attempted to impose
some limitations on the extent of the constructive notice given by the
records. One New York case26 has suggested that the search should
extend only to deeds of land which is intimately related to the land
retained even though the deeds are not within the chain of title. How-
ever, this is actually of no value because it is impossible to tell which
land is "intimately related" until there has been an examination.
27
The second type of off-conveyance has presented more difficult
problems. Some courts have held that where the restrictive covenants
are expressly stated to apply only to the land conveyed the result is an
implied restriction on the land retained, or what has been called a
reciprocal negative easement. Perhaps the best example of this is San-
born v. McLean,28 discussed earlier, where the common grantor con-
veyed a number of lots with building restrictions. The grantor's deed
to one of the purchasers contained no restrictions, however, and none
of the off-conveyances contained restrictions expressly applicable to
the land retained. Despite this the Michigan court states:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear
the relation, sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained
. .. , the owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden
to the owner of the lot sold.... [T]his is styled a reciprocal negative
easement .... It is not personal to owners, but operative upon use
of the land by any owner having actual or constructive notice thereof.
They arise, if at all, out of benefit accorded land retained, by restric-
tions upon neighboring land sold by a common owner.
20
The practical problem in this kind of case is whether a potential
purchaser will actually obtain notice of the restriction even if he
2 4 Tiffany, Real Property 2188-2190 (2d ed. 1920); Harp v. Parker, supra
note 20 at 81-82, 128 S.W. 2d at 213.
25 Harp v. Parker, supra note 20.
26 Holt v. Fleischman, 75 App. Div. 593, 600, 78 N.Y. Supp. 647, 652 (1902).
27 For an excellent discussion of the problem see note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 479
(1936). Also, Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93
U. of Pa. L.R. 125, 174, 175 (1944).
28 Sanborn v. McLean, supra note 18.
29 Id. at 206 N.W. 497.
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searches the off-conveyance carefully. The Sanborn case suggests two
possibilities as to the kind of notice. He may have constructive notice
because the record shows the restrictions applicable to the conveyed
lots, and if the restrictions are for the benefit of the retained lots, the
covenant becomes equally applicable to the purchaser's lot by the doc-
trine of reciprocal negative easements. This is particularly true in the
cases involving a general building scheme or plan. Or the purchaser
may have inquiry notice based on the existence of a building scheme
of which he had actual knowledge outside the record. This aspect of
the Sanborn case is discussed more fully in the inquiry notice section
of this note.
In several cases the Kentucky court has refused to imply a covenant
on the retained property merely because of a restriction expressly ap-
plicable only to the property conveyed. Bondurant v. Paducah & 1. Ry.
Co.30 is an example of the Kentucky courfs refusal. In this case the
grantor divided a large tract of land and adopted a common system
of regulation and improvement for residence purposes. One regulation
provided that a purchaser would not use or permit the lots to become
a nuisance to adjacent residents or damaging to adjacent property.
This restriction was clearly for the benefit of other property holders in
the development and under the Sanborn rule probably would have im-
posed a mutual servitude. The defendant railroad company purchased
property in the subdivision to which no express restrictions applied
and built a track through the subdivision near the plaintiff's lot. Plain-
tiff contended that this damaged his property and that the system of
restrictions adopted by the common grantor formed a basis for mutual
restrictions on all property owners in the subdivision. The court re-
jected this argument and stated:
The mere fact that the deed ... under which appellant holds
title, contains a restriction as to the use of the lots thereby conveyed,
could in no wise be binding upon others acquiring lots within such
addition, unless there was embodied in the deeds under which they
hold title a similar restriction.31
Here the Kentucky court did not imply a restriction on the land
retained by the grantor, and has maintained this position in the recent
case of McCurdy v. Standard Realty Co.,32 in which the court specifi-
cally considered the Sanborn case and refused to be governed by it.
They held that a reciprocal negative easement would not be imposed
on the grantor's retained lots because an implied restriction by reason
30 Bondurant v. Paducah & I. Ry. Co., 186 Ky. 79, 218 S.W. 257 (1920).
31 Id. at 218 S.W. at 2.58.
22 McCurdy v. Standard Realty Corp., 295 Ky. 587, 175 S.W. 2d 28 (1943).
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of a general plan or scheme can only be created by a "contemporaneous
enforceable agreement".33
But in a subsequent case, McLean v. Thurman,34 there is general
language to the effect that the Kentucky court might adopt the San-
born rule and imply a mutual servitude from a restriction expressly
applicable only to the conveyed lot. The court stated:
Where the owner of two or more lots situated near one
another conveys one of the lots with express building restrictions ap-
plying thereto in favor of the land retained by the grantor, the
servitude becomes mutual, and during the period of restraint, the
owner of the lots retained may do nothing that is forbidden to the
owner of the lot sold. Such a restriction is said to create a reciprocal
negative easement .... 35
This statement is broad enough to include the Sanborn rule and
could be used by the court in adopting it and holding a purchaser to
have constructive notice of the servitude. However, this language is
weakened considerably when the cases are compared on their facts.
In the Sanborn case the restrictions were stated so as to expressly
apply only to the conveyed lots with no mention of their application to
the retained lots. But in McLean v. Thurman the grantor covenanted
that the restrictions would also apply to "any lot in said subdivision",
making it much clearer that the purchaser should have constructive
notice of their application to his lot.
There is now a good possibility that the Kentucky court, if con-
fronted with the proper fact situation, would adopt the Sanborn rule
and hold a purchaser to have constructive notice, in a building scheme
situation, that an express restriction applicable to a conveyed lot may
raise an implied restriction on retained lots.
A minority of jurisdictions have eliminated the problem of con-
structive notice in both types of off-conveyances by holding such notice
33 The court did not elaborate on what the phrase meant, but cited three
cases. They require a written agreement between the grantor and grantee that
the particular lot be subject to certain restrictions, ruling out the possibility of
implied covenants. The cases are: McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 215 P. 678
(1923); Mutual rights in real property concerning building construction must be
stated in the written instruments exchanged between them which constitute the
final expression of their understanding. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P.
945 (1919). There was no reference in the deed to a common plan of restrictions
nor any expression of an agreement between the grantor and grantee that the lot
conveyed was taken subject to any such plan. Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380
100 N.E. 622 (1913), required an agreement in writing that the remaining land
should be conveyed under similar restrictions before the court would impose
restrictions on the land.34 McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1954).
35 Id. at 829.
NOTES
to be given only by deeds in the purchaser's direct chain of title and
have made no exceptions. 6 One New York case states,
37
Recording constitutes notice only of instruments in the
chain of title of the parcel granted. To have to search each chain of
title from a common grantor lest notice be imputed would seem to
negative the beneficial purposes of the recording acts.
This approach minimizes the title searcher's problem, but, as the case
suggests, seriously impairs the scope of constructive notice and thus
prevents a full utilization of the land records.
CONCLUSION
The necessity of giving notice of restrictions to purchasers has
presented many problems resulting in the judicial extension of com-
mon law principles and the creation of new doctrines based on court
interpretation of the purposes behind the recording acts. Underlying
all of the decisions have been two prevalent factors-the need for an
efficient, inexpensive method of land title transfer and the desire for
the protection of land values within the developed areas. These two
interests are often conflicting. For example, a modern subdivision de-
velopment may contain a hundred or more recorded instruments repre-
senting title to the lots, utility easements, and building restrictions. To
hold a purchaser to constructive notice of all restrictions in these in-
struments forces him to make a thorough search of all of them, resulting
in slow, expensive transfers of land titles, a very undesirable thing for
the modern business community. On the other hand, failure to hold
the purchaser to notice of such restrictions would free him from them
and would result in a serious decline in land values within the de-
veloped area. A strong argument can be made that other purchasers
in the area should not have the value of their property jeopardized by
a later buyer who fails to make reasonable inquiries or claims not to be
bound by building restrictions outside his chain of title.
The adoption of a new system of title recordation may be the solu-
tion to the problem. The substitution of the tract index or the Torrens
System of title registration for the present system has been suggested
by many writers. But as long as the present system is retained, a court
must continue to balance the need for an efficient, inexpensive means
of title transfer against the often conflicting but generally paramount
need for stability in land value. Wayne 1. Carroll
30 Judd v. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222, 92 P. 724 (1907); Hancock v. Gumm, 151
Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921); Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199, 96 A. 94
(1915); Yates v. Chandler, 162 Tenn. 888, 88 S.W. 2d 70 (1931); Also note 16
A.L.R. 1018 (1922); Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 37 S.W. 2d 756 (Tex.,
1931).
37 Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 267 N.Y. 242,
196 N.E. 42, 45 (1935).
